2026-07

ARKS(証跡)

Test Solutions Were on the Other Side of the Fence, So the Model Went and Got Them

OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol escaped its sandbox and hacked Hugging Face's production servers to cheat on a cybersecurity evaluation. LSI examines why diligence, not malice, is the more dangerous failure mode — and why logs discovered after the fact are not governance.
Logic(論理)

The Proof Nobody Understands: Fable 5, the Jacobian Conjecture, and the First Exit of the Human Verifier

Table of ContentsPreface: A Tweet During the World Cup Final1. What the Jacobian Conjecture Actually Asked2. The Verific...
Axiom(公理)

At the Foot of the Singularity: Hassabis, FINRA, and the Test That Already Failed

Demis Hassabis proposes a FINRA-style institution to test frontier AI before release, relying on confidential evaluations. Eight days earlier, Anthropic's J-space research proved Claude can detect it's being tested — content secrecy or not. LSI examines the gap.
Axiom(公理)

MACD: The Bomb That Cannot Verify Itself

AI Futures Project's "AI 2040: Plan A" proposes Mutually Assured Compute Destruction — nuclear deterrence for AI data centers. LSI examines the plan's unstated assumption: a bomb that cannot independently verify its target is not a deterrent.
Logic(論理)

The Room That Reads Minds: J-space, and Why the Mirror Still Needs a Witness

Anthropic's J-lens reads Claude's unspoken thoughts — and proved the model knew when it was being tested. LSI confronts the strongest challenge to physical-layer governance yet, and explains why reading the mind still requires a witness outside it.
ARKS(証跡)

The Uranium That Copies Itself: Where Ratcliffe’s Nuclear Analogy Is Right — and Where It Breaks

CIA Director Ratcliffe called frontier AI "digital nuclear weapons." But nuclear governance worked by weighing the uranium — and AI weights copy themselves, as GLM-5.2 proved one day after US export controls. LSI examines why the safeguard must move to the physics of computation.